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Abstract  22 
Social transmission of behavior can be realized through distinct mechanisms. Research on primate  23 
social  learning  typically  distinguishes  two  forms  of  information  that  a  learner  can  extract  from  a  24 
demonstrator: copying actions (defined as imitation), or copying only the consequential results (defined  25 
as emulation). We propose a decomposition of these learning mechanisms (plus individual learning)  26 
that  incorporates  the  core  idea  that  social  learning  can  be  represented  as  a  search  for  an  optimal  27 
behavior that is constrained by different kinds of information. We illustrate our approach with an  28 
individual based model in which individuals solve tasks in abstract “spaces” that represent behavioral  29 
actions, results, and benefits of those results. Depending on the learning mechanism at their disposal,  30 
individuals  have  differential  access  to  the  information  conveyed  in  these  spaces.  We  show  how  31 
different  classes  of  tasks  may  provide  distinct  advantages  to  individuals  with  different  learning  32 
mechanisms, and discuss how our approach contributes to current empirical and theoretical research on  33 
social learning and culture.  34 p. 3 
1. Introduction  35 
Imitation  and  emulation  are  two  of  the  most  commonly  researched  social  learning  mechanisms,  36 
especially in studies of primates (Call, Carpenter & Tomasello 2005; Hopper et al. 2007; Horner &  37 
Whiten 2005; Tennie, Call & Tomasello 2009). Several definitions of imitation and emulation exist in  38 
the literature. Here, we define emulation as the copying of the results, or environmental outcomes of  39 
demonstrations  (i.e.,  the  products  of  behavior),  and  imitation  as  the  copying  of  the  actions  of  a  40 
demonstrator (i.e., the behavioral processes leading to the products; Call & Carpenter 2002; Whiten,  41 
McCuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper 2009; Tennie, Call & Tomasello 2006; Tomasello & Call 1997;  42 
Whiten, Horner, Litchfield & Marshall-Pescini 2004).   43 
  The  differences  between  imitation  and  emulation  may  have  profound  implications  for  the  44 
capacity and scope of cultural transmission. In particular, it has been proposed that the capacity to  45 
reliably copy the actions of a demonstrator could make cumulative culture, technology and complex  46 
cultural behaviors possible, as is the case in humans, while non-human ape cultures may be better  47 
referred to as “traditions” (Galef 1992; Tomasello 1996). A reason for this difference is that emulation  48 
learning may be too inaccurate for a cultural ratchet to operate (Richerson & Boyd 2005; Shea 2009;  49 
Tennie et al. 2006, 2009; Tomasello 1999; compare also Whiten & van Schaik 2007). In fact, while  50 
imitation potentially results in the preservation of both process and product with a close one-to-one  51 
relationship between the two, emulation, by focusing only on the product or environmental effects, may  52 
lead to a failure in the preservation of the processes (Tennie et al. 2009).  53 
  To help understand the distinction between emulation and imitation, it is useful to consider a  54 
concrete task. For example, consider the specific task of tying a certain type of knot, and imagine  55 
individuals use different learning mechanisms. Emulators and imitators have access to information  56 
provided by a knowledgeable individual they observe, while individual learners do not have socially  57 
mediated information to guide their actions. If an individual is an emulator, she might have information  58 
about the form of the knot when it is completed, but she is “blind” to the process that produced the  59 p. 4 
knot. In order to arrive at the desired knot, the emulator may perform a series of actions with the rope  60 
without guidance and eventually “compare” her result with the observed knot. By comparison, if the  61 
individual is an imitator, she has additional information on the intermediate behavioral steps (more or  62 
less fine-grained) needed to produce the knot. She could use this information to guide her actions.  63 
Finally, individual learners have neither type of social information available. They rely only on self- 64 
evaluation of the effects that their own actions achieve.   65 
  In what follows, we present an individual based model that investigates the consequences of  66 
using imitation, emulation and individual learning. The model is based on the core idea that social  67 
learning can be represented as a search for an optimal behavior that is constrained by different kinds of  68 
information. Crucially, our approach differs from most other theoretical models that investigate cultural  69 
dynamics  using  mathematical  tools  developed  in  population  genetics  and  epidemiology,  which  70 
typically treat the transmission of cultural traits as analogous to the transmission of genetic material  71 
(starting from Boyd & Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981). Such models tend to focus  72 
on dynamics at the population level, whereas behavior at the individual level, i.e., with respect to social  73 
learning processes, is only loosely described. In these models, “cultural transmission” is usually a  74 
process that involves a simple “transfer” of a behavior between individuals, with some probability  75 
attached to this transfer (e.g. Nunn, Thrall, Bartz, Dasgupta & Boesch 2009). Moreover, very few  76 
quantitative models explicitly consider how different social learning mechanisms can influence the  77 
diffusion of a behavior in a population. In one noteworthy exception, Kendal J.L., Kendal R.L. &  78 
Laland  K.  (2007)  used  a  mathematical  model  to  distinguish  between  stimulus  enhancement  and  79 
observational learning.   80 
  In  our  model,  individuals  solve  various  tasks  described  in  abstract  spaces  that  represent  81 
behavioral processes (actions), environmental outcomes from the behavior (results), and benefits of the  82 
actions. We refer to these as actions space, results space and benefits space, respectively. Depending  83 
on the learning mechanism at their disposal (imitation, emulation, and individual learning), individuals  84 p. 5 
have differential access to the information conveyed in these spaces, with imitators using both actions  85 
and benefits spaces, emulators using both results and benefits spaces, and individual learners using only  86 
benefits space. We illustrate how differently shaped spaces represent different classes of tasks, and,  87 
with  our  model,  we  show  that  these  classes  provide  different  advantages  for  the  three  learning  88 
mechanisms that we investigated. In an extension of the main model we consider chains of individuals  89 
that learn iteratively from one another. This model draws inspiration from the linear transmission chain  90 
method  used  in  cultural  learning  research  and  we  therefore  call  it  the  “transmission  chain  91 
model”(Mesoudi & Whiten 2008). The model allows us to check whether an initial optimal behavior  92 
can be transmitted and maintained across generation using either imitation or emulation. Moreover,  93 
since in the iterative learning process the initial optimal behavior can get “lost”, we can test the effect  94 
of sub-optimal demonstrators on the two social learning mechanisms. In the last section, we discuss the  95 
relevance  of  our  results  to  cultural  evolutionary  modeling,  current  experimental  studies,  and  the  96 
relationship between social learning mechanisms and the evolution of human culture.   97 
  98 
  99 
2. Methods  100 
  101 
2.1 The search space  102 
A task can be described as involving a certain number of actions to be accomplished (Na). For each  103 
action a certain number of different variants (Nv) is allowed. One can consider all possible behaviors as  104 
points  in  this  Na-dimensional  actions  space.  The  number  of  dimensions  represents  the  number  of  105 
actions needed to accomplish the task, while the size of each dimension represents the number of  106 
variants that are allowed for that specific action. To illustrate our approach, we use a simple actions  107 
space,  with  Na=2  and  Nv=15.  In  other  words,  a  task  can  be  accomplished  by  using  the  right  108 
combination  of  two  actions,  and  each  of  the  two  actions  is  chosen  from  fifteen  possible  different  109 p. 6 
variants (giving 15
2 possible combinations). Different combinations of these two actions (i.e., any  110 
determined point in the actions space) are considered different behaviors. We call the actions in the  111 
first dimension “action X” and the actions in the second dimension “action Y.”  112 
The actions space has a correspondence in the results space (see Fig. 1 right panels). Here, for  113 
each point in the actions space (i.e., for each possible behavior) a result may (or may not) be present,  114 
where a “result” refers to an environmental modification that is similar to the observed one. Depending  115 
on the task at hand, some fraction of the environmental modifications may fail this criterion, which is  116 
why not all behaviors lead to results. Again it is useful to think of tying a knot: some combination(s) of  117 
actions can bring the rope to a physical configuration that is perceived by the individual as similar to  118 
the observed knot, while other combinations of actions leave the rope in a configuration perceived as  119 
non-matching, and thus not considered to be a result.  120 
The actions space and results space have a final correspondence in the benefits space (see Fig.1  121 
left panels). Here, each behavior that produces a result also produces a net benefit. Note that the same  122 
result can have different benefits depending on the specific combination of actions used to obtain it.  123 
The underlying logic is that some actions combinations may be more effective than others, even if the  124 
result appears to be the same. These differences in benefits could arise because one action is less costly  125 
than another, as might occur if actions vary in time or energy needed for completion. Consider, for  126 
example, printing out several pages from a long word processing document versus writing them out by  127 
hand. The hand-written document would take much longer to produce and would be of lower quality,  128 
resulting in higher costs and lower benefit. In what follows, we simply use the term “benefit” referring  129 
to net benefits, i.e. benefits minus costs.  130 
Together, the actions space, the results space, and the benefits space form the overall search  131 
space in which individuals search for optimal behavior. Individuals with different learning mechanisms  132 
access different spaces when solving problems – and thus can be “blind” to other spaces. Individual  133 
learners have only the benefits space at their disposal.  Social learners can additionally make use of  134 p. 7 
information produced by a demonstrator in the actions space (for imitators) and in the results space (for  135 
emulators). Thus, the three learning mechanisms differ in their access to information conveyed by  136 
different spaces.   137 
  138 
2.2 Experimental conditions: different types of tasks  139 
To illustrate how the different learning mechanisms can give different advantages to individuals, we  140 
conceived  three  experimental  conditions  that  correspond  to  different  classes  of  tasks.  We  call  the  141 
conditions smooth task, peaked task, and hidden plateau task. In all three conditions, there is a single  142 
optimal behavior, that is, a single point at which individuals obtain maximum benefit (bmax=1), as  143 
shown in Figure 1.   144 
In the smooth task (see Fig.1, a-b), action combinations lie on a linear gradient of benefits. The  145 
closer an action combination is to the single optimum, the higher is the benefit that this combination  146 
gives to the individual. Furthermore, all action combinations that give benefit to individuals produce  147 
the  same  result.  Such  tasks  might  characterize  behaviors  for  which,  first,  even  if  a  best  possible  148 
solution exists, it is only of relative importance to perform exactly the highest rewarding combination  149 
of actions and, second, similar actions combinations give similar benefits to individuals. An example of  150 
a smooth task could be learning to catch a prey. The result (the prey caught) is always the same, but  151 
different  action  combinations  may  be  more  or  less  effective  (e.g.  involving  more  or  less  effort).  152 
Individuals may copy how knowledgeable demonstrators hunt but they can also try different action  153 
combinations and possibly self-evaluate the benefits obtained.     154 
In the peaked task (see Fig. 1, c-d), only one single combination provides results as well as  155 
benefits. Unlike the smooth task, performing action combinations close to the single optimum in the  156 
peaked task does not produce any result and provides no benefit to the individual. For this family of  157 
tasks  it  is  important  to  perform  the  exact  combination  of  actions.  Such  tasks  might  characterize  158 
complex combinations of behavior involved in highly technical activities, where slight deviations from  159 p. 8 
a specific protocol lead to a failure in producing a result. To further elucidate the features of a peaked  160 
task, consider again the example of tying a knot. For some knots, if one performs action combinations  161 
that are similar but not identical to the correct combination needed to tie them, these will produce  162 
neither any usable result nor any tangible modification of the environment.  163 
In the third and last condition, the hidden plateau task (see Fig. 1, e-f), only the single optimal  164 
combination provides benefits, but performing action combinations similar to the single optimal one  165 
produce results that appear to be correct. Such tasks might again represent highly technical behavioral  166 
activities, but in this case, a single correct combination occurs among closely related behaviors that  167 
produce comparable results. Once more we can refer to the knot example: for some type of knots, if the  168 
individual  performs  action  combinations  similar  to  the  correct  one,  she  can  obtain  some  physical  169 
configuration of the rope similar to the knot of interest. Even if ineffective as a knot (i.e., benefits are  170 
zero), the result gives some indication that it is “close” to the optimal behavior.   171 
  172 
- FIG. 1 about here -  173 
  174 
2.3 The learning mechanisms  175 
Individuals perform searches with the aim of finding the optimal behavior on the search space. At each  176 
time step, an individual may modify her behavior by moving in the search space to adjacent actions  177 
combinations or may retain her previous behavior.   178 
  We model this search as a two-stage process. In the first stage, a possible modification of  179 
behavior is selected using the following rule: with respect to the current position of the individual, one  180 
of the two adjacent horizontal cells (action X) or one of the two adjacent vertical cells (action Y) is  181 
randomly  selected  as  a  possible  new  action,  which  would  thus  lead  to  a  new  behavior.  This  182 
modification rule makes two assumptions: individuals can change only one action variant at a time  183 
(either X or Y), and individuals do not have access to all the possible action variants of this type in the  184 p. 9 
whole  space,  but  only  to  a  subset  of  two  neighboring  variants.  The  underlying  rationale  is  that  185 
individuals likely experiment with actions that are somewhat similar to those they performed most  186 
recently. Note that this rule holds for all types of learners, so we are assuming a general “innovation”  187 
rule that underlies all types of learning.  188 
In the second stage, individuals accept or discard the action modifications from stage one. If  189 
they discard the new action, they stay in the same point of the action space they were in before stage  190 
one, i.e. their behavior does not change. If they accept the new action, they will show a different  191 
behavior  in  the  next  time  step.  Three  specific  learning  rules  are  used,  depending  on  the  learning  192 
mechanisms that individuals have at their disposal. Social learners make this decision by exploiting  193 
information from an “ideal” demonstrator who is performing the correct behavior at bmax on the space.   194 
(1) Individual learners accept a new action if it does not reduce the benefit they were obtaining;  195 
otherwise, they discard the new action. Thus, individual learners always accept beneficial or neutral  196 
modifications.  The  assumption  is  that  individual  learners  are  able  to  quantify  the  net  benefits  of  197 
different actions and compare these benefits through time.  198 
(2) Imitators base their decisions on how well the actions match the actions performed by the  199 
demonstrator. If they are already performing one of the demonstrator's action variants, they accept the  200 
modification only if they would then keep performing the same variant; otherwise they discard the  201 
newly selected action. For example, if an imitator already correctly performs the demonstrated action X  202 
(but not the action Y), she will not change her position with regard to the action X, but she will accept  203 
any modification on the action she uses from the action Y. If imitators are not performing any of the  204 
two demonstrator's action variants they always accept every modification. The assumption underlying  205 
this rule is that imitators initially lack knowledge of how to perform an action, but they can compare  206 
their actions with those of the demonstrator.  207 
  (3) Emulators base their decisions on whether the result is obtained (i.e., gray areas of Fig. 1,  208 
right panels). In contrast to imitators, emulators are blind to the actions of the demonstrator, but they do  209 p. 10 
have information on the result. If emulators are already obtaining the demonstrator's result they accept  210 
the proposed modification only if they keep obtaining the same result; otherwise, they discard it (in a  211 
way logically comparable to imitators). In contrast, if they have not yet obtained the demonstrator's  212 
result they always accept modifications. The assumption is that emulators do not know how to obtain a  213 
result, but they know how well their result matches the demonstrator’s result.  214 
As noted above, social learners are likely to also make decisions based on the net benefits that  215 
they obtain.  Thus, in our model, imitators and emulators also make use of the benefits space. More  216 
specifically, they use the benefits space to guide their decisions when the information provided by the  217 
demonstrator can not be used to orient their search, i.e. when they accept the random behavior in the  218 
first  stage  of  the  behavioral  modification  rule  (this  procedure  is  analogous  to  the  “critical  social  219 
learner” in Enquist, Eriksson & Ghirlanda, 2007).  220 
  221 
2.4 Simulations procedures  222 
For each of the three conditions, we tested 10
4 individuals for each learning mechanism (imitation,  223 
emulation, and individual learning), giving 3·10
4 simulations for each condition, for a total of 9·10
4  224 
simulations. At the beginning of the simulation each individual is placed randomly in the actions space  225 
(i.e., she has a random behavior) and the simulation runs until the individual reaches the behavior that  226 
produces the maximum benefit (bmax=1). We collected output on the individual benefit through time  227 
and on the time it took the individual to reach bmax (i.e., the time step in which she performed the  228 
optimal behavior). We also recorded the number of time steps in which social learners made use of the  229 
benefits space information, rather than using the information provided by the demonstrator (results or  230 
actions).  231 
  In  a  second  set  of  simulations  we  sketched  a  possible  extension  of  the  main  model  that  232 
simulates multiple generations of individuals (“transmission chain model”).  We focused only on two  233 
conditions (peaked task and hidden plateau task) and on the two social learning mechanisms (imitation  234 p. 11 
and emulation) without considering pure individual learning. At the beginning of the transmission  235 
chain simulation, a single individual with random behavior learns from a knowledgeable demonstrator  236 
that shows the optimal behavior. After a certain number of time steps the learning phase ends and the  237 
observer, regardless of her behavior, now becomes the demonstrator for a newly introduced naïve  238 
individual. Differently from the main model, in the transmission chain model the demonstrator may  239 
thus show a sub-optimal behavior. In this case, if the observer succeeds in copying the demonstrator's  240 
behavior without reaching bmax=1 (meaning that behavior is sub-optimal), the observer continues to  241 
explore the search space using individual learning, until she reaches bmax=1 or the learning phase ends.  242 
  We iterated this process for 100 generations, varying the length of the learning phase from 100  243 
to 1000 steps (incremented in units of 100) and comparing the results of imitation and emulation for the  244 
2 conditions. This involved a total of 40 simulations (2 conditions X 2 learning mechanisms X 10 sets  245 
of learning steps), which we replicated 1000 times. We collected output on the benefit at the last  246 
generation and on the individual benefit through generations.  247 
  248 
  249 
3. Results  250 
3.1. Main model  251 
In the smooth task condition, the effectiveness of the three learning mechanisms was similar in terms of  252 
average benefits through time and in the average length of time required to reach bmax (Fig. 2, a).  253 
Individual learners exploited the benefits gradient to orient their search for optimal behavior, and social  254 
learning appeared to provide no advantages relative to individual learning. Thus, we found that social  255 
learners generally behaved as individual learners, meaning that they made use of the benefits space  256 
rather  than  the  information  (actions  or  results)  provided  by  the  demonstrator.  Imitators  used  the  257 
benefits  space  in  77%  (±  18  SD)  of  the  time  steps,  showing  that  in  the  majority  of  cases,  social  258 
knowledge was not informative in their search for the optimal behavior.  Emulators used benefits space  259 p. 12 
more often than imitators (98% ± 3 SD).   260 
In contrast to the smooth task condition, in the peaked task condition, imitation outperformed  261 
both emulation and individual learning (Fig. 2, b). In this task, the benefits and results spaces did not  262 
contain  information  useful  to  emulators  and  individual  learners;  hence,  emulators  and  individual  263 
learners basically performed a random search, resulting in a longer average time to find bmax. Imitators  264 
were advantaged because they exploited information on the actions of the demonstrator to orient their  265 
search.   266 
Lastly, in the hidden plateau task, both types of social learners outperformed individual learners  267 
(Fig. 2, c). Imitators were again advantaged over individual learners, as seen in the peaked task.  In the  268 
hidden plateau task, emulators also experienced advantages relative to individual learners, but they  269 
benefited in a different way from imitators. While imitators gained advantages by homing in on the  270 
specific actions to use, emulators used the “plateau” of close results too orient their search (see Fig. 1,   271 
e). Importantly, this plateau is “hidden” to individual learners and imitators.  272 
  273 
- FIG. 2 about here -  274 
  275 
To understand the differential performance of imitators and emulators it is useful to think about  276 
how individuals with different learning strategies view the spaces in terms of attractors (Fig. 3), and  277 
specifically how they use information to move through the space. Imitators move in the space as if they  278 
can attach to the “cross-hairs” of a target. Once they land on a correct action, they move randomly  279 
along the axis defined by this action until they reach the other correct action (Fig. 3, a). In contrast, the  280 
emulators' attractor is the area of the space in which they obtain the demonstrator's result (Fig. 3, b).  281 
Once in the plateau, they move randomly on the plateau until they find the optimum.   282 
  283 
- FIG. 3 about here -  284 p. 13 
  285 
As seen in Figure 3, the relative size of the plateau is likely to determine the effectiveness of  286 
emulation relative to other learning mechanisms. To assess this effect, we ran additional simulations of  287 
emulators in the hidden plateau task in which we varied the dimensions of the results plateau. Results  288 
are shown in Figure 4.  If the area is relatively small (as in the peaked task) the plateau is difficult to  289 
find, reducing the effectiveness of emulation. Similarly, if the plateau is relatively large (as in the  290 
smooth task) emulation is also less effective because finding the plateau does not provide much useful  291 
information to the agent. Finally, for intermediate sizes (as in our hidden plateau task) emulation can be  292 
as effective as imitation.  293 
  294 
- FIG. 4 about here -  295 
  296 
3.2. Transmission chain model  297 
  298 
In the transmission chain model, the learned behavior was iteratively transmitted across generations of  299 
individuals.  Our simulation of this process produced results that were largely congruent with those  300 
found in the main model. Thus, in the peaked task condition (Fig. 5, a), chains of imitators  301 
outperformed chains of emulators. Given a sufficient duration of the learning phase (approximately  302 
from 500 steps), imitation was effective in transmitting the initial optimal behavior across generations.  303 
Emulation was never as effective as imitation in the peaked task, and, even for relatively long learning  304 
phases (e.g. 1000 steps), chains of emulators never achieved the optimal behavior at the end of the  305 
iterative process (i.e. the average final benefit never reached 1). In the hidden plateau condition (Fig. 5,  306 
b), however, the two social learning mechanisms were equally effective in transmitting the optimal  307 
behavior across generations, provided an adequately long learning phase (i.e. greater than about 500  308 
steps).  309 p. 14 
  310 
- FIG. 5 about here -  311 
  312 
   The duration of the learning phase has two effects on learning dynamics. At the level of the  313 
single individual, short learning phases translate in lower probabilities to acquire the correct behavior  314 
from the demonstrator. At the level of inter-generational transmission, however, this effect is amplified  315 
by the fact that, across generations, naïve individuals have sub-optimal demonstrators. The two effects  316 
can be shown considering the case of imitation in the peaked task condition (Fig. 6).  Learning phase of  317 
100 and 300 steps produced an initial disadvantage at generation 1 (effect at individual level). This  318 
disadvantage was amplified across generations. By comparison, for the case of a learning phase of 500  319 
steps, the optimal behavior is maintained across generations.  320 
  321 
- FIG. 6 about here -  322 
  323 
4. Discussion  324 
Our  results  illustrate  how  different  learning  mechanisms  may  provide  individuals  with  different  325 
advantages depending on the type of task at hand, and they suggest that different behavioral diffusion  326 
dynamics  can  be  generated  under  different  learning  mechanisms.  Specifically,  real-world  tasks  327 
comparable to our smooth task can be solved effectively using individual learning, since the benefits  328 
gradient provides a way to orient search behavior. In nonhuman apes, such a situation might be found  329 
in gorilla “nettle feeding” behavior, which involves neutralizing stinging hairs on nettle leaves (a plant  330 
food source). The task space here is indeed likely to be smooth: given extended practice, many actions  331 
can be tried, their relative effectiveness evaluated, and individuals can thus learn how to optimize the  332 
process of neutralizing stinging hairs efficiently. We therefore expect that individual gorillas adjust  333 
their actions so that individuals (and even populations) converge on the same behavior. Indeed, even  334 p. 15 
though social learning of an imitation type was first proposed as a candidate to equip subjects with the  335 
necessary skill (e.g. Byrne & Russon 1998), it was recently found in captive settings that individual  336 
learning (likely together with genetic predispositions) is a more parsimonious explanation (Tennie,  337 
Hedwig, Call & Tomasello 2008).   338 
In contrast, our findings indicate that imitation is especially useful for solving peaked tasks.  339 
Such tasks not only require the chaining of correct actions (in a correct sequence), but they also provide  340 
little  or  no  feedback  for  performing  behaviors  other  than  the  optimal  one  (here  we  assumed  no  341 
feedback was provided). Individuals thus cannot orient their search in any way other than by copying  342 
the actions of a demonstrator. In real-life human culture, many tasks are likely to fit this description,  343 
including  using  cognitively  opaque  artifacts,  learning  a  gestural  language,  or  performing  correct  344 
performances of religious rituals or dances (see Tennie et al. 2009).   345 
Finally, emulation can provide advantages in situations analogous to our hidden plateau tasks,  346 
where emulators may take advantage of the fact that performing actions similar to the correct one  347 
produce a result. Even if the result is ineffective (i.e., benefit is zero), the plateau of results can give  348 
emulators guidance towards achieving the optimal behavior.  349 
These results are confirmed in an extension of the model (“transmission chain model”) where  350 
we considered the effectiveness of social learning mechanisms when individuals learn iteratively across  351 
generations. In particular, imitation can maintain an optimal behavior through generations regardless of  352 
which  kind  of  tasks  is  at  hand  (peaked  task  or  hidden  plateau  task),  while  emulation,  even  when  353 
individuals can learn for relatively more time steps, is unable to preserve good solutions to problems  354 
presented by peaked tasks, which are frequent in human culture (see above).  355 
Different  social  learning  mechanisms  are  rarely  differentiated  in  cultural  evolution  models  356 
(Mesoudi 2009), yet our results show that specific dynamics are generated through interactions of the  357 
tasks and learning mechanisms used. Modeling social learning as a general mechanism of behavioral  358 
transfer can hide this important interplay. Including specific modeling of social learning mechanisms  359 p. 16 
(as  done  here)  seems  advisable  in  order  to  help  distinguish  between  social  and  asocial  learning  360 
diffusion dynamics (Franz & Nunn 2009; Kendal et al. 2007; Kendal, Kendal, Hoppit & Laland 2009;   361 
Hoppit, Boogert & Laland 2010; Reader 2004), as well as for models explicitly dedicated to the study  362 
of social learning in animals or, more broadly, to the evolution of cultural capacities (Nunn et al. 2009;  363 
van Schaik & Pradhan 2003; Whitehead 2007). The case of human culture can be different because the  364 
extensive use of imitation and teaching (Gergely & Csibra 2006; Tomasello 1999) can render social  365 
learning  reliable  enough  to  generally  interpret  behavioral  diffusions  as  genuine  “transmission”  366 
processes. However, it could also be the case that a selective switching of social learning mechanisms  367 
could  generate  different  dynamics  in  humans.  For  example,  the  distribution  of  artifacts  in  the  368 
archaeological record suggests a need to explain patterns not only in terms of population level biases  369 
(e.g. Mesoudi & O'Brien 2008) but also in terms of different mechanisms of learning at the individual  370 
level (Tehrani & Riede 2008).  371 
  Our model could provide new insights to the results of animal behavior studies concerning the  372 
distinction between imitation and emulation. In particular, the results of our model help to better define  373 
which kind of tasks may give rise to an imitative strategy. Many scientists agree that the “difficulty” of  374 
a  task  can  represent  an  important  variable  in  determining  which  social  learning  mechanism  an  375 
individual  will  potentially  use,  with  “easy”  tasks  readily  solved  by  individual  learning  but  376 
“challenging” tasks better solved by imitation (see Tennie et al. 2009; Whiten et al. 2009). In our  377 
model, a “challenging” task is represented by the peaked task and the challenge arises from the absence  378 
of feedback for performing behaviors similar to the correct one. For animal behavior studies this means  379 
that experimental tasks with these particular features are needed to determine whether a species can and  380 
does  use  imitation.  Successful  social  learning  in  tasks  with  smooth  structures  or  hidden  plateau  381 
structures could be explained with mechanisms other than imitation, while, on the other hand, the  382 
absence of imitation in solving those tasks can be due to the search structure rather than an intrinsic  383 
limitation of the species’ imitative ability. This is not to say that a species capable of imitation would  384 p. 17 
only imitate in tasks that have this type of structure. A species able to imitate might use this learning  385 
strategy in a wider range of contexts. For example, humans also imitate in types of tasks for which  386 
other strategies would be equally useful or even better (see above and Horner & Whiten 2005; Tennie  387 
et al. 2006). This phenomenon has recently been dubbed "over-imitation" (Lyons, Young & Keil 2007),  388 
and it seems to hold cross-culturally (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010).  389 
  Finally,  our  results  offer  some  considerations  regarding  the  relationship  between  general  390 
intelligence, the rarity of imitation in primates, and the evolution of culture. In a peaked task, the ability  391 
to reliably copy the actions of a demonstrator is, in our model, much more effective than emulation and  392 
individual learning. Humans face this kind of task repeatedly throughout life and they readily use  393 
imitation to solve these tasks, while this class of tasks is probably uncommon in other primates (Tennie  394 
et al. 2009). Hence, the problems that non-human primates confront in the wild are characterized by an  395 
interaction between genetic predispositions and environmental feedback which may effectively orient  396 
their “search” without the need to copy the specific actions of a demonstrator (van Schaik & Pradhan  397 
2003; Tennie et al. 2009, Tennie, Call & Tomasello 2010), and the same may have been true of some  398 
early hominin artifacts (e.g. handaxes, compare also Richerson & Boyd 2005).  399 
  Perhaps  non-human  primates  do  not  imitate  because  socio–ecological  conditions  have  not  400 
favored imitation. The learning mechanisms available to them suffice. However, when solutions to  401 
problems  in  the  form  of  peaked  structures  started  to  be  invented  and  provided  marked  fitness  402 
advantages to individuals, selection for imitative learning likely increased. This suggests that the initial  403 
diffusion of task solutions in the form of peaked structure created an environment that boosted the  404 
pressure  to  develop  imitative  skills  (i.e.,  niche  construction  effects,  see  Laland,  Odling-Smee  &  405 
Feldman 2000). Widespread imitation in a given population could be used to support a process of  406 
cumulative culture that, in turn, opens up new fitness landscapes involving technological innovations  407 
which are likely to create “complex” solutions to adaptive problems perhaps in the form of peaked  408 
structures, which then favor greater imitative learning ability.   409 p. 18 
It is important to be clear about several simplifications that we made in this first investigation of  410 
the modeling framework. First, we assumed that for each condition only a single optimal behavior  411 
existed (for a coverage of multimodal adaptive landscapes in cultural evolution see Boyd & Richerson  412 
1992; Mesoudi 2008). Second, we assumed a “perfect demonstrator” who, from the beginning and  413 
reliably, performed the optimal behavior (but note that in the transmission chain model this behavior  414 
could get “lost” through the iterative process and so this model is relatively free from such problem).  415 
Third, we assumed that all learning mechanisms have the same implementation costs. As a final issue,  416 
it  is  important  to  stress  that  we  deliberately  omitted  several  psychological  aspects  that  influence  417 
learning processes, including memory and cognitive constraints. The two-stage process of behavioral  418 
modification that we used should not be viewed as an accurate model of real behavioral learning  419 
processes. For example, we are not claiming that real-life imitators actually perform novel behaviors  420 
quasi-randomly and that they then “compare and discard” them if different from a demonstrator’s  421 
behavior.  We  consider  our  approach  as  a  modeling  device  (and  thus  necessarily  and  intentionally  422 
minimalistic) to illustrate the aspect we stated in the introductory section, namely, that social learning  423 
can be interpreted as a search for an optimal behavior constrained by different kind of information in  424 
the social context, and moreover, that different tasks can be modeled as information spaces that have  425 
different shapes.  426 
In summary, our model illustrates a new framework for interpreting social learning mechanisms  427 
that  could  hopefully  be  incorporated  in  cultural  evolutionary  modeling.  The  model  also  suggests  428 
directions for new experiments, shows that the structure of a task is crucial for the interpretation of  429 
experimental  outcomes,  and  proposes  a  framework  to  characterize  different  experimental  tasks.  430 
Moreover,  the  highlighted  interplay  between  a  learning  mechanism’s  effectiveness  and  features  of  431 
different tasks suggest some considerations on the relationship between general intelligence, the ability  432 
to imitate, and the evolution of cultural capacities.  433 
  434 p. 19 
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Figure 1: Features of benefits spaces (left) and results spaces (right) in the three experimental  571 
conditions. Each point on the X- and Y-axes show a particular variant for X and Y actions (i.e., actions  572 
space).  From  top  to  bottom,  panels  show  smooth  task,  peaked  task,  and  hidden  plateau  task.  For  573 
benefits  spaces,  benefits  goes  from  b=0  (black)  to  bmax=1  (white).  For  results  spaces,  gray  color  574 
represents points in which individuals obtain a result and white color points in which they do not obtain  575 
a result.  576 p. 26 
  577 p. 27 
Figure 2: Synthesis of results of the main model. From top to bottom, panels show smooth task  578 
condition,  peaked  task  condition,  and  hidden  plateau  task  condition.  Left  panels:  Time  steps  until  579 
individuals reach bmax=1. Boxes represent the inter-quartile range of the data. The horizontal lines  580 
inside  the  boxes  indicate  the  median  values.  The  horizontal  lines  outside  the  boxes  indicate  the  581 
minimum  and  maximum  values  not  considered  outliers.  Circles  represent  outliers.  Right  panels:  582 
Average  benefits  (on  10
4  individuals)  in  the  first  500  time  steps.  Circles  =  imitation.  Squares  =  583 
emulation. Diamonds = individual learning.  584 p. 28    585 p. 29 
Figure 3: Space attractors for imitators (a) and emulators (b). The black square represents the  586 
optimal behavior in the search space, while the dark gray squares represent the behavioral attractors.  587 
(a):  Hypothetical  trajectory  of  an  imitator  searching  for  the  optimal  behavior  in  the  peaked  task  588 
condition. After the individual arrives in the “crosshairs,” she only accepts moves that keep her in the  589 
crosshairs.  Thus,  the  crosshairs  serve  as  an  attractor.  (b):  Hypothetical  trajectory  of  an  emulators  590 
searching for the optimal behavior in the hidden plateau task condition. In this case, the plateau is the  591 
attractor. Thus, when an emulator lands in the plateau, she only accepts moves that keep her in the  592 
plateau.   593 
  594 
  595 
  596 
  597 
  598 
  599 
  600 p. 30 
  601 
Figure 4: Effectiveness of emulation when varying the size of the results plateau in the hidden  602 
plateau  task.  Average  time  steps  until  emulators  reach  bmax=1  in  the  hidden  plateau  task  versus  603 
dimension of the results plateau. The dimension of the results plateau is expressed as the length of the  604 
side of the results area (a square). In the main simulation this length is equal to 5 points in the results  605 
space (see Figure 1-f).  606 
  607 
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  609 
  610 
Figure 5: Synthesis of results of the transmission chain model. Average final benefit (on 1000  611 
replications)  versus  duration  of  the  learning  phase.  Circles  =  imitation.  Squares  =  emulation.  (a):  612 
peaked task condition. (b): hidden plateau task condition.   613 
  614 
  615 
  616 
  617 
  618 
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  621 
  622 
  623 p. 32 
  624 
  625 
  626 
Figure 6: Effectiveness of imitation across generations (peaked task condition). Average benefit  627 
across  generations  for  imitators  with  different  durations  of  the  learning  phase  in  the  peaked  task  628 
condition.  Circles = 100 time steps. Squares = 300 time steps. Diamonds = 500 time steps.  629 
  630 